W h e n children hear a n e w word, they cle-for example, "a horse." Names for inmust decide whether it refers to t h e object dividuals a r e proper nouns that d o not take as a category member, or as a n individual. a n article-for example, "Trigger." For example, t h e family p e t may b e a cat, b u t I n their spontaneous speech, children it is also a distinct individual, Kitty. This con-attend to form class a n d rarely confuse comceptual distinction is basic to h o w w e talk mon a n d proper flouns ( s e e diary observaabout certain objects, b u t not others. For ex-tions reported in Macnamara, 1982) . Chilample, individual names are given to people dren's ability to use syntactic a n d semantic a n d ships, b u t not to individual pennies or clues to comprehend n e w names was invesparticular coat hangers. tigated in a landmark paper b y Katz, Baker, Children could use two kinds of clues to a n d Macnamara (1974) a n d in research redecide whether a n a m e is for a n individual ported in Macnamara (1982) . Katz e t al. taught or for a category member. O n e is semantic:
children n e w names for objects, varying both knowledge about t h e properties a n d char-t h e kind of n a m e a n d t h e kind of object. Each acteristics of real-world referents. I t simply child was taught o n e n e w word, either a comis not very important to k e e p track of every mon noun (e.g., "a dax") or a proper noun blade of grass, s o w e d o not give each o n e (e.g., "Dax"), for either a doll or a block. Durits own name; however, people are important ing t h e teaching portion of t h e experiment, as individuals s o each has his or h e r o w n children saw only two objects (dolls or blocks) name. A second kind of clue is syntactic: h o w a n d heard o n e of them labeled at least five one's language marks t h e s e t w o kinds of times. T h e n children w e r e asked to perform words. I n English, names for category mem-various actions with "the dax" (or "Dax." debers are common nouns marked b y a n arti-pending on t h e name they had b e e n t aught )-for example, to dress the named doll or to put the named block in a house. Children's interpretation of the new word was inferred from the proportion of times they chose the named object when carrying out the requested actions. Consistent use of one specific toy was considered evidence of a proper noun interpretation. Choosing randomly between the two tovs was considered to be at least consistent with a common noun interpretation.
The results of this research showed an interaction between the syntactic clue (proper or common noun) and semantic clue (type of object named). The syntactic form of the label affected how children chose, but only for those in the doll condition. A proper noun was interpreted as referring to the single, named doll; a common noun was not. For example, if children heard a doll called "Kiv," they picked the named doll most of the time; if they heard a doll called "the kiv," they picked equally between the two dolls. This effect was not found for children in the block condition. No matter what the block was called, children chose equally between the named and unnamed blocks. Katz et al. interpreted these results as suggesting that children distinguish very early on between classes of objects for which individuation is important and classes for which it is not. Children in their study used the syntactic clues from language to interpret the new words, but only when the syntactic clues were semantically appropriate.
These results are important and have been widely cited (Carey, 1982) because they are among a handful of studies that demonstrate children's sensitivity to linguistic form class to interpret new words (see also Brown, 1957) . In addition, they suggest an interesting way in which semantic and syntactic clues interact when children learn new words. However, the studies were limited in several respects, and the results are inconclusive. Interpretation of the studies is problematic because the procedure did not provide a way to distinguish between a common name interpretation of the new word and random responding. For any question, children had only two objects to choose from, either two blocks or two dolls. For example, when told to "Dress the dax," children had only two options: to dress either the doll named "the dax," or to dress the other doll. Choosing the named doll 50% of the time could be evidence that children had interpreted "a dax" as referring to the category of dolls, but it could also mean that children were just guessing. It would have been more revealing if the children had chosen an obiect from an array of toys that included distractor items as well as the two dolls or blocks. Under these conditions the response patterns for guessing and for interpreting the word as a common name would be distinct.
Another limitation of ~a s t research is that children were taught new words for objects that they already could name. Anecdotal and experimental evidence suggests that children of this age resist accepting a new common noun for an object with a known label (Macnamara, 1982) . Given that the subjects probably already knew the category names for dolls and blocks (see Nelson. 1973) . it is ,, possible that they were simply confused when the experimenter said, "This is a wug," rather than, "This is a block" (or his is a doll"). Therefore. the common noun conditions were not fair tests of how children interpret a new common noun.
A final limitation is that the pattern of results described above was true only for girls. Girls as young as 17 months attended to the syntactic clue for new names given to dolls, but boys up to 27 months of age performed randomly. Only one of three studies conducted with boys (Katz et al., 1974; Macnamara, 1982 ) yielded significant results. The findings presented for boys seem fragile and need replication.
The present study was designed to clarify and extend these findings by investigating children's sensitivity to the commonproper distinction with a procedure that avoided the problems and limitations described above. Our study differs from previous work in three respects: we used unfamiliar objects (i.e., objects that children could not easily name); we included appropriate distractor items; and we standardized the experimental procedure.
Method
Subjects.-Thirty-two children (range = 2-2 to 3-0;mean age of girls = 2-7; mean age of boys = 2-6) of middle-class and uppermiddle-class backgrounds participated in the study at their nursery schools. There were eight subjects per condition, four girls and four boys. The two female researchers were familiar to the children because they participated in the nursery room activities for at least one half-day session before testing began. Three children were replaced as subjects because they refused to respond to the experimenter's requests.
Design.-The experiment was a 2 x 2 factorial design with type of name (proper or common) and type of toy (animal-like or blocklike) as between-groups variables.
Materials.-Four toys were used in the experiment: two blocklike toys that are known commercially by various names, including Magic Flowers and Crazy Comets, and two animal-like toys. Like the dolls in Katz et al. (1974) , the stuffed animals could sensibly receive proper or common names; like the blocks, proper names were not appropriate for the Crazy Comets. The toys were selected to be relatively comparable to one another in complexity and attractiveness. Also, the two tokens of each type (e.g., both stuffed animals) were made distinct, so that the children could easily tell them apait. Each stuffed animal stood upright, about 7 inches high, had peach-colored ful; bright orange ears, long arms, a big belly, and eyes (but no other facial features). One had bright yellow hair and a bikini top; the other had lavender hair and a string of beads around its neck. Each wore a pink hair ribbon. The plastic Crazy Comets each measured about 2 j: 2 x 2 inches when folded up. These toys can be folded and unfolded to form various shapes: a cube, a "star," an oblong box. One was multicolored (gold, red, and green); the other was painted a solid blue.
These toys were undoubtedly novel to our subjects, and not previously labeled for them. We did not ask a separate group of 2-year-olds to name the toys, since 2-year-old children often overextend familiar labels to unfamiliar instances outside of the relevant category (Clark, 1973) , and the status of these overextensions is unclear (Rescorla, 1980) . However, an informal survey of four older children (8 and 9 years old) and several adults revealed that they had never seen these toys before and could not name them.
In addition to the four toys, a basket and a small square of cloth (a "washcloth") were used in the experiment.
Procedure.-Subjects were tested individually in a private room at their nursery school. The experimental session had two parts: a naming portion and a testing portion. During the naming portion, children were shown all four toys: two stuffed animals and two Crazy Comets, and one of the toys was named six times. Children in the proper noun conditions heard a proper noun (e.g., "Zav"); children in the common noun conditions heard a common noun (e.g., "a zav"). For children in the animal conditions, the name's Gelrnan and Taylor 1537 referent was one of the stuffed animals, in the Comet conditions, one of the Crazy Comets. The particular toy named (e.g., lavenderhaired animal or blonde animal) was counterbalanced across subjects in each condition.
For each child, the word that was used as the toy's name was randomly chosen from a list of nine nonsense syllables, selected from Katz et al. (1974) , including "zav," "mef," "kiv,>' "jop;' " wug," "zon," "tiv," "vit," and "cak." To teach the name to the child, the experimenter named the toy six times during a short play session. For example, the experimenter took the toys out of a basket one at a time and, on coming to the target object, said, "Look, this is Zav [a zav]!" The experimenter referred to the other toys as "this one" or "this." The toys were handled in random orders throughout the session.
During the testing portion of the task, children were asked to perform nine simple actions. For each child, five of the actions were randomly designated as test items, in which children had to choose an object on the basis of its new name (e.g., "Put Zav in the basket"), and four were randomly designated as filler items, in which the experimenter handed the child the object to be manipulated (e.g., "Put this in the basket"). Each of the four toys had a turn as the object used in the fillers. Filler questions were included so that children would be less tempted to choose a toy simply to handle it, and so that the test session would not seem to concentrate exclusively on the named toy. The order of questions was randomly determined for each child, with the constraint that no more than two questions in a row were either fillers or test items. All four objects were within the child's reach at all times. By including distractors (e.g., the stuffed animals were present when the child was being taught a name for a Crazy Comet) we could distinguish random guessing from interpreting a word as a common noun.
The nine actions were: put in a basket, hide, wash, drop, hold, put over (child's) head, throw in a basket, turn upside down, and point to. Before each request the experimenter asked, "Do you know how to [requested action]?" After each test trial, the child's choice of toy to manipulate was recorded on a data sheet, along with any spontaneous comments. Recording t h e chosen toy was straightforward, with one exception. When asked to put "Kiv" in a basket, one child threw all the toys into the basket but one, then cradled that one in her arms and said to it, "Hi, Kiv!" For this trial, the child was scored as having chosen the toy she spoke to, because her interpretation of the word "Kiv" seemed clear from her behavior.
At the end of the session, the experimenter pointed to each toy in turn, in random order, and asked the child if it was "[a] Zav" (using the name the child had learned).
Results
Each child was given three scores indexing the proportion of times he or she chose: (a)the named object when performing the requested actions, (b) the unnamed object from the same category, and (c) either object from outside the category. These data are shown in Table 1 .
A 2 x 2 ANOVA on the mean proportion of trials that children selected the named tov (a proper noun interpretation) yielded a significant type of name X type of toy interaction, F(1,28) = 4.33, p < .05. Neither main effect was significant. This was similar to the analysis used by Katz et al. (1974) and Macnamara (1982) and replicated their results. Children picked the named toy more often in the proper animal condition than in the other three conditions. A follow-up analysis showed that children who heard a proper noun chose the named animal more (69%) than those who heard a common noun (44%), t(28) = 1.79, p < .05, one-tailed test.
We then calculated a contrast score to measure children's tendency to select either toy within the category of the named object. This tendency would indicate a common name interpretation of the new word (for discussion of contrasts, see Keppel, 1973) . This score was calculated by assigning weights of + 1for the number of times the children chose either toy from the named category and -1 for the number of times they chose either toy from the unnamed category. For example, if a child in a stuffed-animal condition chose an animal four times and a Comet once, the child would obtain a score of 3. Subjects received high scores if they interpreted the word as referring to either or both members of the category of objects named by the new word. For the seven children who did not answer on one or two items, the contrast score was calculated as the proportion of trials the child chose either toy from the named category multiplied by 5, minus the proportion of trials the child chose either toy from the unnamed category multiplied by 5. This adjustment gave equal weight to every subject in the experiment, because all other subjects had five trials each.
A 2 x 2 ANOVA on the contrast scores yielded a significant main effect for type of name, F(1,28) = 4.94, p < .05, and a significant type of name X type of toy interaction, F(1,28) = 3.95, p = .054. There was no significant main effect for type of toy. In both animal conditions and the common Comet condition, children picked predominantly within the category of the named object. The mean contrast scores were: proper animal condition, 4.3; common animal condition, 4.4; common Comet condition, 4.8. However, in the proper Comet condition (M = 1.4), half the children chose outside of the category. These children chose a stuffed animal instead of a Comet. This strategy was used predominantly by boys and accounts for the one significant sex difference, a toy x name x sex interaction. F(1.24) = 4.11. a = .051. It seems that these'children attknded to the form-class of the word-that is, the absence of an article-and searched for an object that could sensibly receive a proper name-that is, an individual, animate object. This view is supported by the finding that every child who showed this pattern consistently chose only one of the stuffed animals throughout a session. For example, one child might choose the lavender-haired animal, another might choose the yellow-haired animal, but once Katz et al.'s (1974) procedure, which precluded choosing outside of the category.
An additional analysis was performed on the within-category choices only. It was possible that children in the proper Comet condition who were not choosing outside of the category were also sensitive to the syntactic clue and preferred the named toy. For this analysis, the proportion of within-category trials on which each child chose the named toy was calculated. The four children who chose predominantly outside the category (i.e., on more than half of the trials) were not included in this test. A 2 x 2 ANOVA calculated on these scores yielded a significant main effect for type of word, F(1,24) = 4.123, p = ,051. The type of word x type of toy interaction was not significant, F(1,24) = 0.713. Children in both animal and Comet conditions chose the named toy more often in the proper noun conditions (M = 72%) than in the common noun conditions ( M = 51%). However, t h e difference b e t w e e n common and proper conditions was significant only with stuffed animals (proper condition M = 76%, common condition M = 47%), t(24) = 2.114, p < .05. Although children did choose the named Comet more on hearing a proper noun (M = 66%) than a common noun (M = 56%), this difference was not significant, t(24) = .605, p > .l.In fact, these children often chose both Comets at once when given the proper name.
We analyzed children's responses to the yeslno questions ("Is this [a] zav?"), but found them uninterpretable. Across the conditions, only four children answered the set of four questions correctly. There were no discernible patterns to the answers the other children gave.
Discussion
Even with unfamiliar kinds of toys, children use semantic and syntactic clues when interpreting new nouns. Our data replicated previous findings (Katz et al., 1974; Macnamara, 1982 ) that children interpret a new proper noun as referring to the named individual when a proper noun is semantically appropriate. Our data showed this effect for both boys and girls, perhaps because our children were slightly older than Katz et al.'s Gelman and Taylor 1539 subjects. In addition, our use of distractor items revealed the strategies that had appeared as random responding in the earlier work. Given a common noun (e.g., "a zav"), children in both animal and Comet conditions interpreted the word as a categoiy name. Given a proper noun (e.g., "Zav") for a blocklike toy, some children interpret it as referring to a single stuffed animal; others seemed to interpret it as a category name.
It is interesting that children in the common noun conditions clearly generalized the new word beyond the named instance to others in the category. We can say this with assurance because, unlike Katz et al. (1974) , we included distractor items to distinguish between chance responding and choosing within the named catezorv. It is somewhat -,
surprising that children were willing to generalize the word meaning-for example, to select an unnamed toy when asked to "Put a zav in this basket." One might think that, to be safe, children would continue to choose the object the experimenter had labeled. However, subjects did not hesitate to generalize the common noun to other category members. This was not simply because of forgetting which was the named animal, since children consistently chose the named animal when given a proper noun.
Our data suggest that children are more sensitive to linguistic form than indicated by the Macnamara (1982) findings. Even when the children heard names for blocklike toys, they attended to the form class of the wordfor example, "Zav" versus "a zavn-to derive meaning. Half the children in the proper Comet condition showed a preference for picking outside the named category, seeming to search for a single, animate referent for the proper noun, even though the name had been given to a Crazy Comet. What process could account for this error? Perhaps the initial pairing of proper noun and Crazy Comet made no sense to these children. During the naming portion of the session, they may have ignored the label completely. Then, during testing, they may have tried to figure out the meaning of the word anew. This possibility suggests that children may be able to interpret new common and proper nouns without any teaching whatsoever. Brown (1957) has demonstrated that 4-and 5-year-old children can rely on foim class to inteipret novel count nouns, mass nouns, and verbs. It seems clear from our results that, even for 2-year-olds, linguistic form class is a powerf~tl source of information for children acquiring new words.
